We evaluate the impact of decision timing on the outcome of the decision, when both the timing and the relevant decision are chosen under uncertainty. Betting markets provide the testing ground, as we exploit an original dataset containing more than one million online bets on games of the Italian Major Soccer League. We find that individuals perform systematically better when they place their bets farther away from the game day. The better performance of early bettors holds controlling for (time-invariant) unobservable ability, learning during the season, timing of the odds, unobservable game heterogeneity, and favorite team bias. We attribute this result to the increase of noisy information on game day, which hampers the capacity of late, non-professional bettors to use very simple prediction methods, such as team rankings or last game results. We also find that more successful bettors tend to bet in advance, focus on a smaller set of events, and prefer events associated with smaller betting odds.
Introduction
Decision timing is a key ingredient of decision making in many settings. Whenever the effect of a choice depends on the future state of the world-e.g., betting, financial markets, firm's strategy-agents face the additional choice of whether taking their decision close to or far from the future event. On the one hand, waiting for a last-minute decision may allow them to improve their information set. On the other hand, if they cannot efficiently process all inputs accruing in proximity to the event, information overload may be detrimental.
We study this tradeoff in the context of sports betting for two reasons. First, as we exploit a large dataset on repeated online bets, we can estimate the effect of the distance from the event on the probability of success by accommodating for the endogeneity of distance choice and without losing statistical accuracy. In particular, we control for unobservable heterogeneity at both the individual and event level, as well as for a number of time-varying confounding channels. Second, as we focus on a population of non-professional bettors, we isolate behavioral regularities that may extend beyond our context. The first element validates the internal validity and the second the external validity of our econometric strategy.
To test our hypothesis that decision timing matters, we analyze the winning probability of bets placed in two different seasons of the Italian Major Soccer League. The dataset contains more than one million online bets. The 7,093 individuals in our dataset are non-experts, who bet small amounts of money on multiple events to increase their potential payouts and only win if all the events happen. Betting on soccer relies on the availability of objective information, such as team rankings and win-loss records, which represent reasonably good predictors of game outcomes. For these reasons, we believe that the distance from game day is a significant factor among those determining how these non-professional bettors process and make use of the available information. The tradeoff highlighted above is clearly at work.
Betting too early might force individuals to dismiss relevant information, such as players'
injuries that happen close to the game. On the other hand, betting late faces individuals with a large amount of information, which increases with the public relevance of the event, comes from multiple sources, and may not be easy to handle.
In our empirical strategy, we control for individual fixed effects, therefore accommodating for (time-invariant) unobservable ability. Indeed, when we refer to "early" vs "late" bettor, experts. Both strands of the literature aim at analyzing the conditions under which the availability of comprehensive information and professional advice is fully discounted by market prices (that is, betting odds) and rules out observable biases that could allow speculators to make higher-than-average returns.
A large body of empirical evidence supports the view that bettors' behavior does not conform to the rational choice model and is affected by a number of cognitive biases (Diecidue et al. 2004 ). First, bettors show a tendency to under bet favorites and over bet long-shots (Golec and Tamarkin 1995) . Second, they exhibit decision biases such as confirmation, gambler's fallacy, and overconfidence related to inaccurate information processing (Blavatskyy 2009 ). Third, bettors adopt a series of heuristics whose suitability is context-dependent (Conlisk 1993 ). Finally, they are not effective enough in discounting the effect of noisy and redundant information and in reducing the impact of information overload (Bleichrodt and A major strand of research concerns horse-race betting, which is a naturally occurring asset market in which the transmission of information from informed to uninformed traders is typically not smooth. Betting markets are efficient if they aggregate less-than-perfect information owned by all the participants and disseminates it to all the bettors. Figlewski (1979) investigates odds and forecasts of a number of bookmakers and experts concluding that racetrack betting markets discount quite well the available information, although bettors exhibit different degrees of accuracy depending on whether they are on-track or off-track bettors. Snyder (1978) , Hausch et al. (1981) , Asch et al. (1984) , and Ziegelmeyer et al. (2004) provide evidence on the tendency to under bet favorites and to over bet long-shots.
Baseball, basketball, football, and soccer are sports in which the sources of insider information are less relevant than in racetrack. Pope and Peel (1989) analyze the fixed odds offered by bookmakers and the forecasts made by professional tipsters on UK soccer league games. They argue that betting markets are efficient in preventing bettors to gain abnormal returns on the basis of public information, but odds do not fully reflect all the available information. This finding is confirmed by Forrest and Simmons (2000) , who consider newspaper tipsters offering professional advice on English and Scottish soccer games. They conclude that tipsters show a clear inadequacy in discounting the information publicly available on the newspapers. Moreover, their performance in predicting games is less successful than 3 following the very simple strategy of betting on home wins.
The fact that the condition of being experts is not necessarily associated with a high degree of forecasting accuracy is extensively discussed by Camerer and Johnson (1991) for various domains (medical, financial, academic). Their conclusion is that experts' superiority in processing information is not strictly related to performance superiority, which is crucially affected by the matching of experts' cognitive abilities with "environmental demands" (Camerer and Johnson 1991, p. 213 ). An interpretation of this finding can be traced back to Oskamp (1965) , who argues that the extent of collected information cannot be directly related to predictive accuracy. While predictive ability reaches a ceiling once a limited amount of information has been collected, confidence in the ability to make accurate decisions continues to grow proportionally (Davis et al. 1994 ). This induces overconfidence in decision-makers, who become more confident independently of the quality of collected information (Angner 2006 ).
Bayesian-rational individuals tend to be relatively overconfident, overweight information of which they overestimate the precision, and underweight it in the opposite case (Van den Steen 2011). Further exposure to sources of information is consequently distorted by confirmation bias: once decision-makers devise a strong hypothesis, they will tend to misinterpret or even misread new information unfavorable to this hypothesis (Kahneman and Tversky 1973 Rieskamp and Otto (2006) , and Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011) argue that decision making can be better explained by models of heuristics rather than by the standard rational decision model. Anderson et al. (2005) use recognition heuristics to account for nonexperts' performance in soccer betting. According to Newell and Shanks (2004) , recognition heuristics are assumed to demand little time, information, and cognitive effort, and exploit the relationship between a criterion value (e.g., success in home win) and its predictors (e.g., team rank position). Heuristics perform quite well in environments affected by noisy and redundant information such as sports forecasting. Noisy information is defined as an information structure in which not only can one signal indicates several states, but also several signals can occur in the same state (Crawford and Sobel 1982) . In Dieckmann and Rieskamp This condition of "information overload" characterizes media information on Italian soccer, which provides the ground for our empirical analysis. The amount of information to be processed is greatly increased by the variety of communication systems on TV, the internet, and newspapers. Furthermore, much of the information is not original and watchers continuously process information received from other sources but differently presented.
Our dataset, which is described in the next section, includes small bets, generally evenly distributed across individuals. Therefore, it can be safely assumed that the individuals contained in our dataset are non-expert bettors.
Empirical strategy and data
Based on the literature surveyed in the previous section and on the available data, we test the following behavioral hypothesis.
H1 (information overload):
As soon as the event approaches, the amount of noisy information available to bettors increases, therefore reducing their winning ability.
At the same time, we control for the following confounding hypothesis.
H2 (learning):
Bettors improve their performance over time, as they get more acquainted with the environment and the relative strength of the teams.
We use a unique (large) dataset of online bets from a provider specialized in this field.
The company is located in Southern Italy, but bets are made from all over the country. for away win). These types of event account for 85% of all bets.
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The occurrence that bettor j correctly forecasts event i at game week t (W ijt ) can be modeled as follows:
where γ j are individual fixed effects (capturing all time-invariant characteristics of bettor j, including his/her intrinsic level of sophistication and ability); X ijt is a vector of time-varying attributes linked to bettor j (such as the amount of money bet at game week t, or the number of other events linked to event i in a multiple bet); Z it is a vector of time-varying attributes of event i (such as whether the home team or the favorite team won the game); g(.) is a function of the distance from the day individual j places the bet to the day event i occurs (
is a function of game week t; and ijt is an idiosyncratic error clustered at the event level. To test H1 (information overload), we consider three specifications of g(.): linear function of D ijt (which we call "betting distance"); dummy equal to one if the bet is placed before the game day and zero otherwise ("betting early"); non-parametric specification including a set of dummies for each value of D ijt (which varies from zero for bets on game day to a maximum of 5 days). To control for H2 (learning), we introduce three specifications of f (.): Specifically, among the covariates related to event i, we consider the dummy "main teams,"
equal to one if the bet concerns at least one of the four leading teams during our sample period; the dummy "strong team wins," equal to one if the stronger team (measured by the relative ranking position in the league) wins; and the dummy "home team wins," equal to one if the home team wins. Among the attributes of each bettor j's decision, we consider the amount spent by the user in each game week ("amount by user"); the number of the other single bets associated with i ("other events"); and the official evaluation that the betting company gives to each event when the bet i is placed by individual j (betting "odds").
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To exploit the richness of our (large) dataset, we also augment the baseline specification in equation (1) in two ways:
where HT i is a set of dummies capturing the home team, and ρ i are event fixed effects. In equation (2), the individual-times-team fixed effects are meant to accommodate for the fact that individuals might adopt different timing when betting on different teams (e.g., their favorite one). 5 In equation (3), the inclusion of event fixed effects controls for the fact that bettors might bet earlier on events easier to forecast according to unobservable features of the event itself. This specification, however, comes at the price of a reduced identifying variation, as it only exploits users who place multiple bets on the same event.
[ Tables 1 and 2 here] Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of our variables. In our data, 45% of single bets are successful. This does not mean, however, that bettors have such a high winning rate, because single bets may be part of multiple bets (on average slightly more than 5 bets are made in each play, with considerable variability), and some of them may be wrong. Indeed, the winning rate in multiple bets is quite low: 5% on average. Most bettors place their bet on the same day of the event, while early bettors (i.e., those who play in the previous days)
are about 32%. The average amount spent per bettor in a game week is 211 Euros, again with a large standard deviation. Almost 40% of bets are made on the main four teams. Table 2 provides information on the above variables and on bettors' socio-economic characteristics by betting distance. We also test whether means are different between bets placed on game day and bets placed before. Thanks to the large sample size, a lot of differences are statistically significant, although most of the time economically small. Early bets tend to be placed on stronger teams, and to be associated with a larger number of multiple bets. Tables 3, 4 , and 5 report our baseline specifications as in equation (1) . In the first three columns, we do not control for individual fixed effects, whereas this is done in the last three columns. The latter represent our preferred specifications, but it is instructive to compare results with and without fixed effects. As discussed above, to control for possible learning we use three specifications: linear trend in game week (columns 1 and 4); quadratic trend (columns 2 and 5); and a full set of game week dummies (columns 3 and 6). The difference between the three tables concerns how we model betting distance: linearly in Table 3 ; with the dummy "betting early" in Table 4 ; and with a full set of dummies for each value of the betting distance, which is measured in days, in Table 5 . Table 3 shows very similar results across all specifications. The coefficient of betting distance is significantly positive and very stable: the farther away from the event date the bet is, the higher the probability of winning. On average and for the same bettor, betting one day earlier increases the chance of winning by about 0.8 percentage points, that is, by about 1.8% with respect to the average probability of a correct forecast. Betting at the beginning of the week that leads to the event, as opposed to betting on the game day, increases the chance of winning by about 9%. This provides evidence of potential information overload.
Empirical results and discussion
Consistently with the previous literature, we find very strong effects for both dummies "home wins" and "strong wins" (equal to 40.8% and 60.9%, respectively, with respect to the average outcome). The ability of winning is positively and significantly affected by the monetary amount that each player bets, meaning that there is higher effort as long as more money is involved, with a large effect with respect to the average outcome (37.4% for an increase of the amount equal to its standard deviation). Betting for the main teams gives a higher probability of winning too. Columns 2 and 5 include the variable game week squared.
We do not report its value since it is extremely small; therefore the linear specification is fairly good. As long as the season goes on, however, bettors worsen their performance, as highlighted by the significantly negative coefficients for the game week trend in both the linear and quadratic specifications. Finally, as we would also expect, higher odds are associated with a lower probability of winning (-46.0% for an increase of the odds equal to the standard deviation).
[ Tables 3, 4 , and 5 here]
In Table 4 the regressor of interest is the dummy "betting early," equal to one if the bet is placed on one of the 5 days preceding game day. This variable is significantly positive, meaning that the probability of making a correct forecast is higher when the bet is made in advance. On average and for the same bettor, the chance of winning increases by 1.3 percentage points (that is, by 2.9% with respect to the average). All the other variables confirm their behavior from a qualitative and quantitative point of view. Table 5 includes a full set of dummies for each value of betting distance. The effect of the distance from the event on the probability of winning is monotonic, as it increases to its maximum when individuals bet 5 days in advance. Wald tests on the equality of coefficients confirm this increasing effect as we move away from game day. Again, all of the other variables confirm their behavior. Tables 6, 7 , and 8 report the specifications augmented with additional fixed effects as in
equations (2)-first three columns-and (3)-last three columns. The inclusion of individualtimes-team fixed effects is meant to account for the fact that bettors might adopt different timing strategies with respect to different teams, such as their favorite one. The inclusion of event fixed effects is meant to capture unobservable game heterogeneity. We repeat these specifications for all measures of decision timing discussed above, that is, betting distance (Table 6 ), the dummy "betting early" (Table 7) , and the full set of dummies for the days of distance ( Table 8 ). The empirical results are almost unchanged. All point estimates remain statistically different from zero, even though their size is attenuated by the inclusion of event fixed effects. Here, however, we are skating on quite thin ice in terms of identifying variation, as we only rely on bettors who placed multiple bets on the same game.
[ Tables 6, 7 , and 8 here]
We also address heterogeneity issues, that is, we evaluate whether the effect of betting distance is stronger in specific subsamples. This is meant to further evaluate our informationoverload interpretation of the (positive) effect of betting early. Specifically, in Table 9 , we distinguish between bets on one of the main four teams of the Serie A and on all other teams.
In Table 10 , we discriminate between bets done on many events (that is, above the median of events associated between each other in multiple bets) or a few events (below the median).
In the last row of each table, we report the p-value of the Wald-test on the equality of the estimated coefficients of betting distance for each pair of subsamples.
[ Tables 9 and 10 here]
In Table 9 , betting distance is always significantly positive, but the size of its coefficient is about three times larger when only the main teams are involved in the bet. This is consistent with our interpretation of the positive impact of betting early, because information overload on the event date is expected to be even more relevant for major teams. Compared with the previous estimations, another relevant variable changes its behavior: game week is usually positive in the linear specification when the main teams are included, and negative otherwise.
Therefore, we observe some positive learning when the main teams-which are usually under the spotlights of newspapers-are involved. In Table 10 , interestingly, the effect of betting early is quantitatively larger for bets linked to other bets in a multiple play. Again, in these circumstances, information overload is likely to exacerbate fallacies in decision making and to reduce the probability of winning.
[ Figures 1, 2, and 3 here]
Finally, the estimated individual fixed effects allow us to shed some light on additional behavioral patterns in our data. Figure 1 shows that more successful bettors (that is, those with a larger fixed effect) also tend to bet in advance, from 3 to 5 days before the event takes place. This regularity, of course, does not affect the estimates discussed above, as they accommodate for unobservable heterogeneity, but it is an interesting finding per se. More skilled bettors seem to anticipate information overload and place their bets in advance. They are also more selective, as they place a smaller number of bets ( Figure 2 ) and focus on bets associated with smaller betting odds (Figure 3 ), which are arguably easier to forecast. 
Conclusion
We find that decision timing matters. From the analysis of more than 1,250,000 online bets, we obtain an economically small but statistically very significant and stable difference in the winning probability of early versus late bettors. The estimated effect controls for bettors' unobservable heterogeneity, learning, betting odds, and unobservable characteristics of the event. Therefore, when we refer to "late" versus "early" bettors we are comparing the same individual making bets at different distances from each event. The poorer forecasting performance of late bettors is attributed to an inefficient processing of information, which is also consistent with the heterogeneity results that we are able to disclose.
The late bettors' decision process may be affected by various cues that, unknown to earlier bettors, have scarce relevance for predicting the outcomes. The excess of noisy information (especially harsh if the same individual decides to bet on the main teams or on multiple events) reduces the possibility of using very simple prediction methods, such as team rankings or home team winning. The use of these criteria and cues greatly improves the possibility of placing a winning bet. Some skilled bettors partly anticipate the issue, as individuals with larger fixed effects tend to bet from 3 to 5 days in advance.
We acknowledge two main limitations of our results. First, they are based on small stakes and we cannot rule out that when stakes are higher information processing could become more efficient, therefore bringing about positive learning and lower confusion from several sources of information. Second, we cannot rule out the fulfillment of other emotional objectives rather than standard profit maximization. Notes. The number of observations is 1,205,575 for all variables. P-value refers to a t-test of the equality of means in the subsamples of bets placed in the game day (Distance=0) vs. before the game day (Distance>0). Notes. Dependent variable: probability of correctly forecasting the single event (included in either a single or multiple bet). Estimation method: linear probability model as in equation (1). Standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. Notes. Dependent variable: probability of correctly forecasting the single event (included in either a single or multiple bet). Estimation method: linear probability model as in equation (1). Standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. Notes. Dependent variable: probability of correctly forecasting the single event (included in either a single or multiple bet). Estimation method: linear probability model as in equation (1). Standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. In italics, p-values for Wald tests on the equality of the coefficients of the betting-distance dummies. Notes. Dependent variable: probability of correctly forecasting the single event (included in either a single or multiple bet). Estimation method: linear probability model as in equation (2) Notes. Dependent variable: probability of correctly forecasting the single event (included in either a single or multiple bet). Estimation method: linear probability model as in equation (2) Notes. Dependent variable: probability of correctly forecasting the single event (included in either a single or multiple bet). Estimation method: linear probability model as in equation (2)-columns 1-3-or (3)-columns 4-6. Standard errors clustered at the individual×team level in columns 1-3 and at the individual level in columns 4-6 are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. Notes. Dependent variable: probability of correctly forecasting the single event (included in either a single or multiple bet). Estimation method: linear probability model as in equation (1) in separate subsamples (bets linked to a higher-than-median number of multiple bets vs. others). Standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. The Wald test p-value captures the significance of the difference of the coefficients of betting distance in the two subsamples.
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